The sensitivity of such a test would be 0. This test had a sensitivity of 91% versus 61% for the glass slide count method, which is a large improvement.
The sample size is pretty small here and the control group even smaller. The paper concludes that a larger study is necessary to confirm the result.
I'm amused by the contrast between Apple's attention to detail on the implementation and their failure to recognize that a virtual knob with a touchscreen or mouse is a fundamentally bad idea.
The author also makes this error, praising Apple's design prowess and denigrating its competition while failing to recognize they "didn’t always react the way I thought they would" because they're ill-suited to the medium.
"Make [a slider] bigger while the mouse button is held down, and warp the mouse so that when you let go you pick up where you left off" has been a solved problem for decades.
And with traditional toolkits (i.e. not HTML) it will even be fast.
I was able to debug and fix someone's MainStage patch last night over SMS when they sent me pictures of their screen, where all the knobs were visible.
Being able to see the full state of the thing is important. Hiding it behind interactions is just as bad as hiding it behind menus.
Sidenote, you have to do this on native because pointer lock/warp is not universally supported in web browsers.
author here - I made this comment elsewhere, but I still think apple made the right call even if it leads to a bit of confusion at first.
As others have pointed out, sliders have limits & knobs don't, so I do think they have their place on touchscreens.
If a digital knob needs to be turned several times (e.g. 1080º, common in DAWs), the "default" way to interact with a knob on a touchscreen - circling again and again - is slow and uncomfortable. Adding "slider" gestures on top of the default behavior is a nice way to perform many turns quickly and easily.
I'm curious - what UI mechanism would you use instead?
This doesn't seem to be an example of assisted suicide being recommended to disabled people who didn't want to die. Mainstream medical practice at the time condemned Kevorkian, and anyone seeking out his services was certainly aware that what he offered was death.
Society puts a lot of pressure on the people at the bottom. The chronically ill and the unemployed. That pressure in combination with an option to permanently relive yourself of that pressure is to many functionally equivalent to a recommendation.
Euthanization of the disabled has been a consistent part of the eugenics movement. For example George Bernard Shaw quote
> A part of eugenic politics would finally land us in an extensive use of the lethal chamber. A great many people would have to be put out of existence simply because it wastes other people's time to look after them.
Shaw and other Fabian Society members were supporters of the group now called Dignity in Dying [0], which used to be called The Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society and was founded by a doctor.
Nazi Germany committed involuntary euthanasia of disabled people in a program called Aktion T4 [1]. It's probably not an accident that Dr Kevorkian, an American, started publishing his euthanasia papers in Germany. Before that he was trying to harvest blood and organs from inmates, which is another area where the incentives seem very bad.
I can't comment on how often modern assisted suicide programs recommend it to disabled people who don't want suicide. But it's clear that Kevorkian was not careful about who he recommended assisted suicide to. So given the strong desire of some people to euthanize the disabled against their will, the lack of carefulness is concerning and suggests that it likely happens with some regularity except in exceptionally run programs.
> Revealed preference shows that American eaters value price above all-else.
I've thought quite a bit about revealed preference in the context of recommendation algorithms. It's tempting to believe what people do in a given situation reveals what they actually prefer despite claims to the contrary, but psychology has long theorized it's more complicated than that. There's a complex interplay of conscious preference, subconscious impulses, information availability, and executive function.
The hard part is quickly convincing someone of the value proposition when there's an option that will ultimately be more satisfying than the quick and familiar.
Laws penalizing theft of services usually work even if they haven't accounted for the exact manner in which someone might steal the service in question.
The author knew there was a fee for the service; the author devised a way to obtain the service without paying the fee; the author knew this action was not authorized by the service provider.
Once, long ago, I ended up buying the wrong ticket from Deutsche Bahn. I no longer remember whether this was my fault or theirs, but I do remember that support was completely unhelpful.
My credit card provider was considerably more helpful when I solved the problem with a chargeback.
Yes, DB tickets should only be booked via a payment provider that allows for chargebacks.
I know of instances where the end result of a more than half a year support escalation process of the highest instance said "you (the customer) did everything correctly, but our support provided wrong advice. Bad luck though, as we don't consider ourselves accountable for mistakes in the support process. Please stop contacting us."
I once bought the wrong ticket, got checked, and the staff told me I had to leave the train at the next station. The ticket I purchased was actually more expensive than the "SuperSparPreis" for the correct ticket. So, I ended up paying more and twice for this journey.
Yes but I mean, they are so inhuman. My wife was once refused migraine medication because the dokter made some mistake on receipt, they could see her in pain in the car. But computer says no.
Sure, they'll be in trouble perhaps when going against the computer, but then if no one can go against the computer, why bother with humans?
To be clear: I prefer the humans. But self-thinking ones.
Ad hominem is an argument that a claim should be rejected because of something about the person making it. "This source has a history of bias, so you should assume this article is biased" is ad hominem.
"This source has a history of bias, but this article is accurate" is the opposite; it tells the reader not to draw an ad hominem conclusion.
A piece of open source software running on Alice's computer exchanges keys with a piece of open source software running on Bob's computer. Later Alice and Bob exchange messages encrypted with those keys through Charlie's server.
Eve, a police officer has evidence that Alice and Bob are messaging each other about crimes and obtains a warrant to require Charlie to intercept their communication. Charlie has no ability to do so because it is encrypted with keys known only by Alice and Bob.
If you want a different result, someone has to proactively change part of this process. Which part should change?
One option is to mandate that any encrypted messaging software also give a key to the government or the government's designee, but someone using open source software can modify it so that it doesn't do that, which would be hard or impossible to detect without a forensic search of their device.
Another option is to mandate that a service provider like Charlie's only deliver messages after verifying that it can decrypt them. This, too is hard to enforce because users can layer additional encryption on top of the existing protocol. Signal's predecessor TextSecure did that over SMS.
Both of those options introduce a serious security vulnerability if the mechanism for accessing the mandatory escrowed keys were ever compromised. Would you like to suggest another mechanism?
About the only thing I can think of is to mandate the use of (flawed) AI to identify messages that seem nonsensical and refuse to pass them, and then to play a game of Chinese-style DPI whack-a-mole in an attempt to suppress open alternatives.
If you have the ability to run custom software—even if it’s a bash script—you can develop secure alternatives. And even if you somehow restrict open source messaging, I can just use good old pen-and-paper OTP to encrypt the plaintext before typing it in, or copy/paste some other text pre-encrypted in another program. But even then, all this will do is kick off a steganographic arms race. AI generated text where the first letter of each word is the cyphertext may be nearly impossible to identify, especially at scale.
If anything like this were to pass, my first task would be making a gamified, user-friendly frontend for this kind of thing.
For a real-world example of the problem you're describing, China's Salt Typhoon attacks compromised lawful intercept infrastructure in the USA to engage in espionage. A mandatory backdoor in Signal would be at risk from similar attacks.
