Well, vendors' randomly modified android systems are chock full of bugs, so it could have easily been some fancy os-specific feature failing not just in your case, but probably plenty other apps.

> is an environment that both coders and artists could use.

Maybe Rive fits this well enough? (Not affiliated, just looked into it at a time from a render engine perspective)

I came here thinking the same. To me, it looks like Rive is the closest tool with the highest potential to be a Flash replacement.

There are hardly any rulings/laws about the topic, and it quite obviously changes the picture of licenses.

I guess it depends on if the source data set is part of the training data or not (if it's open source it is likely part of it).

A lawyer could easily argue that the model itself stores a representation of the original, and thus it can never do a "fresh context".

And to be perfectly honest, LLMs can quote a lot of text verbatim.

It's an Android service. But unlike on regular Android where Google play services have hard-coded special permissions, on Graphene it is an ordinary android service with all the same strict rules applying to it, as to any other service you could write.

So an application of course can use other android services if it declared that, that's why it can see whether it's running or not. But you are in full control whether google play services is installed, and what it can use.

Of course this may break certain apps (Google maps location sharing will probably not work with the location permission denied for play services), which may or may not degrade gracefully.

Unlikely. The reason graphene doesn't run ön non-pixels even today is that it depends on certain hardware features that most vendors (beside Google) lacks.

I wouldn't think this applies to Motorola.

Security theater, it has absolutely no use. If you can't trust your hardware that it won't actively listen to the microphone without your knowledge and permission then what are you even doing with that device?!

I do trust my device. However in specific circumstances where privacy may be critical, an additional protection might save me even from a state-sponsored attack.

If your threat model is state-sponsored then I hope for your sake you're just LARPing, because if not you're in for a bad time with some of the solutions you advocate.

This is just a shallow dismissal. I'm sure state actors can break into my phone. I'm also sure that they can't track or record me when kill switches are off (unless there is another device nearby). Tell me why I'm wrong and please stop repeating how surprised you are that people are so very stupid.

For kill switches on a device with otherwise comparatively abysmal security to be the better security choice over a device with thorough and comprehensive security paired with OS-level radio and sensor switches, you would have to demonstrate that the infinitely more vulnerable device's physical kill switches are somehow significantly more effective at addressing your threat model than software switches in a trustworthy OS. If they are approximately equally effective then you have given up a lot for no benefit, and are net much worse off.

Again, I get the human factors appeal of physical kill switches, and if all else were equal they may be worth having, but people are place far too much faith in the value of physical kill switches.

> For kill switches on a device with otherwise comparatively abysmal security to be the better security choice

Same strawman as earlier: I already replied that I never said that Librem 5 was more secure. At least you accepted that the kill switches do work, so there is progress.

> If they are approximately equally effective then you have given up a lot for no benefit, and are net much worse off.

(I won't claim they are, but) there is another benefit in freedom, apart from the security. Some people care about freedom. When I see that, I suggest Librem 5 in my replies, and not as a more secure solution. Maybe you should read my replies more carefully before answering.

You can't have secure software running on arbitrary insecure hardware.

And even then they still don't live up to their promises, it is still not open hardware - there are a bunch of proprietary firmware, but especially silicon on these devices.

That's just security theater. If you can't trust the very CPU/OS that it only uses the camera/microphone when the notification is on, then what are you even doing with that device?