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That's exactly the type of stuff that slows down response times for legitimate calls. 911 is for emergencies, not for bad sign design.

>official things are marked very clearly and undeniably

Yes I am sure they all have timestamped PGP signed messages signed with the official german government keys.



I assure you that if you found that box sitting there and called 911 and they sent someone out to check it out, no one would ever question the legitimacy of your call. You seem to be forgetting where this box was located. The bad sign design by itself is not absolutely convincing of course but considering all circumstances, the location of the box, the maybe somewhat real danger of terrorism in exactly this area, the easy build and also the psychological aspects.. Yeah, this would be a legitimate call to at least the local PD.

Also I am talking about logical undeniability.. And I think you know already..


It's useful to note that there is a billboard off of 101 NB, as I recall just south of the 280 interchange, that literally tells you to call 911 if you see anything suspicious. In San Francisco, calling 911 on this is just following instructions.


They have non-emergency numbers too.


> I assure you that if you found that box sitting there and called 911 and they sent someone out to check it out, no one would ever question the legitimacy of your call.

Do you know what the operator says when you call 911?

> You seem to be forgetting where this box was located

In a relatively low traffic area?

> Yeah, this would be a legitimate call to at least the local PD.

Yes, the non-emergency number. Not 911 FFS

> Also I am talking about logical undeniability.

Logical undeniability? Logically terrorists would spend far more time making their sign look legitimate, since DHS doesn't really need to be worried about someone thinking their not-a-bomb is a bomb.


Heh, this got me thinking of the feasibility of cryptographically signed, err.. signs.

A QR code can hold 2953 bytes of binary information, so more than enough for a 2048 bit public key.

Same code can also hold 4296 bytes alphanumeric, which would be sufficient for even a decently long message and its associated signature.

A government could post the fingerprint of their key on a site, and post a QR codes containing a signed message about the sign on the sign itself.

Like so: https://imgur.com/a/fWZpt

Sign sign sign. Got some semantic saturation happening now.

Sounds somewhat absurd, but definitely feasible for homeland-security-type things like this random box.


If you used Ed25519 you could get that significantly smaller.




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