After reading the article, no, the Navy probably does not need more overpaid business consultants with powerpoints full of easy answers. It needs to do something about inexperienced, undertrained, overworked crews in its ships.
The CO and XO shouldn't be sleeping while their ship is crossing a busy sealane full of behemoth freighters driving on autopilot in the dark.
The author of the book commanded a US Navy nuclear sub. At the time he assumed command, it was one of the worst performing subs in the fleet. The book is about the organizational and management lessons he learned as he transformed it into a top performing sub.
The Navy deliberately understaffs their vessels to meet unrealistic budgets. Overwork, fatigue, mistakes, and catastrophe are the inevitable consequence.
The only thing more predictable is the scapegoating of ship personnel and the untouchability of those who create the conditions which guarantee eventual disaster.
My experience in the navy was the opposite: Ships were typically crewed with about 1.5X the number of sailors that were actually needed.
I always suspected this was partly because lots of sailors means a big navy base, and a big navy base means a booming local economy in that congressional district.
If the crew is the same crew that is deployed in wartime, there is a reasonable chance that there will be casualties but the the ship has to keep going as best it can. It would be very sensible if naval doctrine had the ships somewhat over crewed as a routine measure.
If that also helps politically that is a bonus.
Source: I once talked to some dude who was both important and in a Navy.
In my time on a ship we were always undermanned. All the development I've seen in new systems to replace those I worked on (arresting gear and catapults) focus heavily on reducing required manning. We never did busy work or work that was unnecessary when we were under way and flying aircraft. In port - yeah sometimes.
Most current sailors I talk to are overworked, training gets gundecked, following safety procedures and impede advancement - what's reworded is a "can do" approach that takes large risks.
I don't know anyone currently serving, in any command, who says they have too many people.
I was on a nuclear sub from 1996-1999, so it's possible that my observations are no longer valid or don't apply to surface ships. But I suspect that my assessment would be the same even today. I worked with enough surface sailors to see that the amount of bullshit work they did was comparable to ours, and they didn't have nearly the physical space limitations that a submarine does.
It's not so much that we were doing "unnecessary" work, but rather that many tasks which required a dedicated person were so trivial that any reasonably competent sailor could easily handle two or three of them at once, or the task could be even more reliably automated.
One quick example is the fathometer operator: When we were sailing in shallow or uncharted waters, a sailor had to spend hours doing absolutely nothing but watching the depth gauge so he could give a verbal warning if we were in danger of running aground. This is not a job that requires a person's full attention even in the most challenging undersea terrain.
To some extent it's necessary to break jobs down into simple repetitive tasks so that they can reliably be done in a high-stress environment, but the navy really took it to an extreme. The end result was the overwork and fatigue that others are referring to.
Possible explanation:
a navy ship runs on rotation of three watches, each in turn taking control of the ship for 8 hours. Thus a ship ought to have a crew of 3x the manpower needed to run it. So by "crewed with about 1.5X the number of sailors that were actually needed", GP means a very understaffed vessel.
My anecdote: enlisted and officers sleeping in hallways. Not enough time to sleep much less walk to their rack.
If you don’t believe a warship needs that many personnel on duty, that is different. Most of the crew aren’t there to sail. Cargo ships, for example, have a dozen crew at most. And their duty is to sail the ship from one port to another.
Any mention if this was a reserve (TAR) ship? The last ship I was on (FFG-19, 1995-1997) was ship designated for training reservists. We had 2/3 of the normal crew as active duty sailors and on weekend a month we would spend the weekend at sea with the full crew (complimented by reservists). We still deployed (on counter-narcotics operations) just like the rest of the ships on the waterfront even though we were 33% short on personnel.
The CO and XO shouldn't be sleeping while their ship is crossing a busy sealane
Why aren't these people "the best of the best", to quote the trite line from Top Gun?
According to Wikipedia, the US Navy has 282 deployable combat vessels. It employs a total of 325,673 active duty personnel plus 270,265 civilian employees.
So out of those 600,000 people, they can't find a few thousand who are willing, able, and capable of commanding a destroyer? The US Naval Academy alone graduates 1000 people a year. Where do they all go? What do they all do?
Really? I'm serious. My understanding is that the absolutely most prestigious military assignments are in "command" positions. Those assignments are the key to climbing the promotion ladder.
Why is that? Battleships are badass and you don't have to spend the whole time in a tiny metal box underwater. If you're joining the Navy, don't you want to be in command of a big ship in the open seas?
The US Navy doesn't own any battleships. After fleet carriers, the next level is going to be destroyers and missile cruisers.
According to Wikipedia, the US decommissioned its last battleship in 1992. Even then, the US Navy largely forswore battlehsips after WWII, and battleships were decommissioned and recommissioned twice during the Cold War. The last time two battleships ever fired at one another was the Battle of Surigao Strait 74 years ago.
Really, the advent of military aviation made them more or less obsolete in WWII.
There were almost no ship-to-ship battles involving battleships in WWII; they were used almost exclusively to shell inland targets close to shorelines, but there are much more efficient ways to do that and those ways aren't limited to striking targets within gun range of the shoreline.
So it's pretty much carriers and destroyers as far as combat ships on the surface these days. (Not sure the term "destroyer" is used much these days, but the non-carrier surface combat ships are roughly comparable in size to what would have been called a destroyer in the old days)
And then of course you have the many amphibious assault ships, support ships, etc.
From my readings of US Navy of WW2 and personal experience in modern day tech companies, I think it's not just the bureaucracy that's at fault. Rather, the organization (actually any organization) by default favors those who manage their superiors well for more/faster promotions. So a lot of times, the best of the best doesn't necessarily rise to the top, but rather those who are good at self promoting.
1. IN WW2, US Navy admirals learned painful lessons to trust captains who manage subordinates well, not the superiors.
When US was suddenly pulled into WW2, the submarines of US navy in WW2 did not achieve much at beginning. For months, US navy submarines failed to sink enemy ships. One big factor was faulty torpedoes. US navy had recently finished developing a new type of torpedo with a magnetic detonator. It was supposed to be a very effective weapon. But due to budget restrictions before WW2 (in the Great Depression), not enough testing was done. If I recall correctly, after spending the precious budget to develop a new type of weapon, not one complete torpedo with live warhead was actually fired in a realistic manner. But I digress.
The real reason US submarines did not achieve much initially at beginning of WW2 in the Pacific theater was the captains on the submarines. A captain in a WW2 submarine disproportionately influences how well or badly the submarine's crew performed. The captain's aggressiveness, skill, carelessness, excessive cautiousness, and etc all directly determined what the crew in the submarine achieved. When the US submarines in Pacific theater finally began to sink Japanese ships at a satisfactory level, it was discovered not a single (or very few) US Navy captain who had reached the rank before the war was still in command of a US submarine. They had failed to achieve results, and were replaced with proven captains who knew how to actually manage the crew below him on the submarine, not manage the higher officers in officers' club.
Basically, before WW2, a US navy officer who was competent enough, projected image fit for a captain, AND managed his superiors well got the promotion. Well ok, previous statement is my own assumption. But the fact is when a shooting war began, it was discovered the officers who got command of a submarine prior to the beginning of WW2 couldn't find the enemy or shoot straight when it really mattered.
US navy finally began promoting officers who knew how to manage the crew below him well and had a killer instinct, not the ones with superior social skills. US navy brass learned that the enemy did not care how good a US Navy officer was at self marketing/promoting.
2. My own managers who moved onto bigger firms.
I've been in US tech scene (IT), about 15 years. Of the managers I had during that time, 2 managers (at separate firm/time) who were above me went on to work at globally well known tech/entertainment firms in tech VP roles. I mean really well known firms. Not Google or Facebook but older, established firms. Top of the heap. Because I worked in small companies with these managers, I got to observe them in close proximity.
What I remember the most of them 2 is how incessantly they visited/chatted/hung-out with the CEO. Sure a lot of it was work I'm sure, but I also know it was a lot of befriending, kissing up, using one's social skill. I as a staff member was given slices of their time, but nothing like the attention given to the CEO.
And sure enough, both firms were closed down. Of course a LOT of it was beyond their control. But it also shows they as managers couldn't find the right project to tackle or manage their subordinates effectively so the company could make $ to survive. Well, maybe or maybe not.
But I do know they spent a lot of time and energy befriending the higher-ups above them. And, I trust the hard lessons US Navy admirals in WW2 learned, that were paid for with lives. The lesson that you should avoid those who spend much energy at self promoting, as they don't actually deliver when it matters.
The trouble with that advice is that people on the receiving end of smooth talking don't think, "this guy is smooth talking me so I should promote him," instead they feel a mysterious attraction and then promote the guy for a reason they can't really explain but can come up with a justification for.
>>> they feel a mysterious attraction and then promote the guy for a reason they can't really explain but can come up with a justification for.
For a domain (tech industry) that is supposedly dominated by facts and numbers, there is a lot of promotion and hiring based on such mysterious feelings, not based on actual facts and numbers. Culture fit?
The US Naval Academy alone graduates 1000 people a year. Where do they all go? What do they all do?
In the Star Trek reboot Kirk goes straight from Academy sophomore to commanding a capital ship in a matter of days.
It is not like that. It takes many years. Only a small percentage of Academy graduates will ever get there. And many have no ambition to either, there are lots of other challenging and prestigious jobs in the Navy. You could be a fighter pilot or a SEAL platoon commander, neither of those career paths leads to commanding a destroyer.
Are there any active members of the US Navy that remember our last real boat fight?
I think some really big fights and even a bit of an ass kicking has some rejuvenating powers for big military apparatus. The military likes to really teach from mistakes, they make lots of noise about what does and doesn’t work after a big fight, they change. I’m not saying the navy hasn’t seen action but they definitely have t seen WWII style battleship to battleship action in 70 years, we don’t even have battleships anymore...
The role here is supposed to be that the big boss watches so that everyone behaves. Plus so that big boss takes blame. It is not like that person would be required for something active.
> The CO and XO shouldn't be sleeping while their ship is crossing a busy sealane full of behemoth freighters driving on autopilot in the dark.
That was certainly how it worked 40 years ago aboard the USS Enterprise (the aircraft carrier, not the starship). Day or night, the CO would always come to the bridge whenever another ship got to within about two- to four miles and was predicted to come within one mile. And in traffic, e.g., transiting the Strait of Malacca, the skipper would be on the bridge pretty much continuously. (Not the XO; his full-time job was basically running the ship's internal operations.)
It makes you wonder if this is a Nasa / Challenger situation, wherein the captain decided not to come to the bridge during one incident, nothing happened, and so that rapidly became SOP on this ship.
Or, as the broader lesson goes, taking a risk without it blowing up doesn't necessarily mean the risks are less. It might just mean you were lucky.
Floated alongside the Enterprise in the 70's on a nuclear cruiser. In engineering we didn't change watch getting underway on entering port until past the sea marker or tied up.
Yeah, I was a nuke SWO on the Enterprise; it was the same in engineering as on the bridge. (I was there '76 to '79, so this is probably not the first time you and I have crossed paths <g>.)
Would that have been feasible (in terms of the captain being a human being that needs rest) on a ship like the Fitzgerald that operates pretty much 24/7/365 in busy waters?
I never served aboard a "small boy" (a.k.a. "tin can" a.k.a. destroyer), so I don't know what their operational tempo is like. On the carrier where I did serve, if we had extended up-tempo ops, there'd be times when the most-senior officers other than the CO and XO would take turns as "command duty officer" on the bridge as a backstop for the more-junior officer-of-the-deck (OOD), so that the skipper could get some rest. Of course, a carrier has lots of pretty-senior officers — small boys, not so much.
And to be sure, it's not quite apples to apples. An aircraft carrier normally spends most of its time in the open sea: To launch and recover aircraft (other than helos and vertical take-off and -landing aircraft), the carrier needs miles and miles of room to steam at high speed into the wind without having to change course for traffic. (If you're steaming into the wind at, say, 30 knots, the aircraft being launched or recovered get a head start in staying above stall speed.) Depending on the circumstances, even in peacetime a carrier might have one or more weapons-loaded aircraft in alert status, ready for launch on comparatively-short notice as a combat air patrol (CAP). When that's the case, the ship would need to be away from traffic, in case it had to quickly turn into the wind to put up a CAP. That's why, except when entering or leaving port, or transiting, carriers usually stay away from highly-trafficked areas.
The CO and XO shouldn't be sleeping while their ship is crossing a busy sealane full of behemoth freighters driving on autopilot in the dark.