It surprises me that there isn't a single comment pointing out that corporations like AT&T don't collect all that data for fun. This actually costs them a lot of money, but they're legally required by the government. While everyone is blaming the company, did you not take a second and contemplate how weird it is that you're fine with the government (and now everyone else es well) getting a record of all your phone activity? I'm old, back in my youth we'd have referred to that as a dystopian surveillance state.
There's no federal law requiring AT&T to hold onto this data.
There's possibly a FISA court requirement (too secret to reveal), but AT&T has long been an exceedingly willing part of the gov's spying apparatus. It fed these records and Internet data to the feds without any court order, and only escaped legal troubles when Obama, contrary to his campaign promises, gave AT&T, Verizon and more retroactive immunity
I'm no longer under this specific NDA, so, I can talk a bit about this.
It was well known in the wireless industry that ATT collected and kept the most data on all of the carriers: 7 years for text metadata, "7 years" for call history (I put that in quotations because it was rumored that ATT kept them indefinitely, but, there were technical limitations for restoring data that far back), and 7 years for the contents of the text messages themselves. Verizon was up there as well, but, I don't remember specifics.
The carrier that I worked with kept only 3 days content of the actual messages, 28 days for the text message metadata, and 28 days for the call records for their enforcement database, but, they could get calling records and sms envelope information for billing back 7 years, and at the time, we had to implement sharding at the database layer that maintained the warrant database due to the amount of traffic that we were receiving from the calling systems and the amount of queries/data that we were sending out, in near realtime, to law enforcement users who paid $10,000/month for access to that data.
AT&T wasn't storing this data out of the kindness of their heart, it was a (probably small) revenue stream for them.
Ah, back in the day the FBI would pay our CTO $5000/hr to talk to and work with him. On top of that we would charge them a monthly colo fee for their equipment that collected data of customers.
Sometimes they had warrants, but mostly just bought the data.
A year or so after 9/11 and that relationship lasted years.
the EU is much more aggressive at banning and censoring websites though. I can't recall the last time I ran into a website in the US that's blocked at the provider level (private moderation like e.g. Youtube is a different story). Maybe Tiktok is the most famous, but it's still around and available afaik. But in the EU, ran into "the government has decided this information is bad for you" all the time, with a nice notice from the internet provider. My hunch is that under various pretexts both societies will continue to drift towards more censorship and less privacy, perhaps with some temporary local differences.
Not everyone in law enforcement gets to play with the NSA's toys though. Some actually have their warrant and subpoenas glanced at by a judge before it gets rubber stamped.
While being briefly "glanced at" by a judge is certainly better than nothing (or just already having the data like NSA), practically it just means law enforcement needs to adapt some generic boilerplate justification text to each request.
That’s the AT&T Long Lines Building. It probably did have an NSA surveillance closet, but it wasn’t built without windows for that reason. The story I was told (by older colleagues when I worked at AT&T Labs) was that it was built during a time when riots and street violence were more common, so the fortress appearance was to ensure the city could maintain long-distance connectivity during urban unrest.
I believe there was another similar nexus downtown near the World Trade Center, which was destroyed on 9/11. For at least a couple of weeks we had very limited communications and credit cards were hard to use as a result.
Long lines buildings were not going to take a direct nuclear hit, but were very robust to handle shockwaves and EMP.
I came very close to buying a long lines microwave relay site, and got to tour it a few times. It had a hardened tower, as well as copper grounding that went deep into the ground. Mining the copper would have paid for the site, but alas.
These buildings were built based on the 1950s threat of Soviet bombers attacking the United States. The New York City metro area was protected by air defense missile sites and interceptors. The air defense systems would air burst small nukes in wartime to destroy bomber formations.
Once the threat shifted to ICBMs in the 1970s hardening was moot.
Yup, an underground structure would normally be a better design. But that would quickly get flooded with water in Manhattan in the event of a nuclear blast followed by loss of power.
Americans like to complain about the GDPR, but it exists to prevent exactly this sort of thing. Data cannot be retained longer than it's actually needed or required by law, and can't be sold without explicit permission. Law enforcement can't just buy data: they need to have legal authority to get it (though in many countries the bar for that is too low). In most cases the cheapest and easiest approach is to collect as little data as possible, and to delete it as soon as it's not strictly needed. This greatly reduces the compliance burden.
You obviously did not follow the recent drama in the EU related to Chat Control V2.
The EU wants LEOs to have access to the contents of your messages/emails/metadata and keeps extending the Chat Control V1 law in order to not have to delete the data that it already has.
You may not be able to buy that data outright but it will be out there and collected by the messaging providers on behalf of the EU.
It even had a data retention law that forced providers to keep up to 8 years of data related to their customers so that it could be handed over to LEOs.
The EU's stance on privacy is just lipstick on a pig. When you pick under the curtain of the privacy laws in the EU, you'll see that it's not better here than in the US.
> You obviously did not follow the recent drama in the EU related to Chat Control V2.
It is strange to say they wanted it when we have proof it is voted down and widely unsupported. A part of the EU government apparatus wants it, but taking that and saying the EU wants it is not honest.
I have talked about it around me a bit and most people who do not work in tech or who don't have a certain interest in online privacy or privacy in general don't know about it.
Of course when you ask the citizens of the EU if they are cool about being monitored at all times by the EU LEOs then they don't want it but the commission wants it bad. All this is due from the heavy lobbying that has been happening in Brussels.
The worst part is that this is happening while the EU is saying that it wants data sovereignty, and wants to become less dependent on the software coming from the US, but it's ready to get in bed with a US company in order to deploy this mass surveillance system who supposedly is very good at finding CP.
Nevermind the fact that it means that every bit of online communication will be analyzed and dissected by a corporation that is out of reach of the EU.
But the commission is not stupid, they carved themselves a nice little clause so that they can be exempted from such mass surveillance. I guess they understand that having all telecommunications monitored by a for profit company that is not from the EU could lead to some embarrassing data leaks, just like we saw with AT&T but they don;t care if it's our data that leaks as long as it's not theirs.
That is why to me GDPR is just a facade. You can't seriously say that you are pro privacy and pro democracy if you keep trying to recreate the Stasi on a larger scale.
CP is just a pretext to keep records on everyone. Good thing everyone over 40 in Eastern Europe still remembers the Stasi and its sister secret police agencies that collected data on everyone and tortured political prisoners. I suspect that climate activists are the next likely candidates for an eventual repression apparatus, so better beware.
Portugal and Spain also aren't found of their politicians from 50 years ago (their regimes fell in 1974, and 1975, respectively). To add to your point.
How does it look on one hand to say that the EU cares about it's users data and wants the users to be able to choose who it is shared with, has clear guidelines related to it's storage and levy fines on companies who breach these terms and then turn around and come out with Chat Control V2?
Something does not compute. Either you are pro privacy and you act like it or you are not.
It kills me to hear that Europe is pro privacy, because it is not true. Not if you look under the veneer and start peeling back the layers.
These sorts of data breaches should be a wake up call for any state actors who are planning on collecting massive amounts of data on their citizens.
It should make them pause and say, you know maybe we should not just give away all our data to Russia or China if they manage to break in our system.
Maybe the best way to avoid such data breaches is to not store the data in the first place.
The US also has laws that, in isolation, would suggest some sort of protection against universal corporate/government surveillance, but they’re no more effective here than in the EU.
They are talking about Americans on this site, who very often work at companies that GDPR is made to stop predating on users. Many European users here also works at such companies, so you often see it from them as well, but not as often since those companies are mostly American.
Ah got it, I totally missed that context here somehow. I hadn't noticed a habit of Americans here complaining about GDPR, but that's interesting given another common pattern here of libertarian ideas. An American complaining about a different countries internal policies doesn't seem particularly libertarian.
Well, that's kinda the point, but way too many website owners rather torture their users with barely compliant implementations than do what the GDPR intended: get rid of third parties.
I'm positive informed consent doesn't require cookie banners, but the advertisers opted to make it as annoying as possible so that everyone would click "accept" just to be left alone. It could be a browser mechanism that only asks once for all sites and have a whitelist.
Let's not pretend that the GDPR fixes this in any way. There are still EU data retention laws in place which force ISPs/carriers/... to store all kinds of data for a reasonably long time.
I don't know who Europe's biggest telco is, but if they got breached, the damage would be just as bad.
There's required disclosure using an administrative subpoena for records over 180 days old if they have them
CALEA requires phone (and later broadband) equipment to conform to wiretapping standards, and if a carrier gets a court order to wiretap it has to provide that data from warrant receipt til warrant expiration.
Landlines have some data retention requirements.
But there's no law on broadband or wireless data retention.
There may well and likely is a secret FISA court order under section 702 that's been served to telecoms, but an astonishingly small number of people in govt and industry know whether that actually says that they just have to hand over records in real time or whether they need to keep records for some period of time.
Being required to do something doesn't justify doing it poorly. AT&T brought in over $3 billion with a B of profit with a P in Q1 2024. They have more than enough money to secure their systems. They're not struggling. In March of this year they bought back 157M of their stock. They could have instead put that money towards security, but they didn't: they put it towards enriching shareholders.
It was snowflake’s lack of security that did this not ATT. Not saying ATT is a paragon of security or anything but snowflake was where the hack took place.
A vendor’s security is the clients security. Companies might choose a vendor for CYA in these instances, but if someone decides to send all of their internal business data to a third party, they better have a pretty good idea what will happen if that third party fails.
Snowflake has the same shared-responsibility structure as any other cloud provider: they provide enforcement but you are responsible for setting up and protecting your own credentials and permissions. They can’t impose “security” unilaterally in the abstract.
It’s mostly AT&Ts fault but it’s sort of a side effect of Snowflake making their product easy to use and most of the industry overlooking credential reuse risks.
Databases are not historically internet facing so data compromise also meant getting network access. But Snowflake provided web access to your database so they were “easy to use” database as a service (“cloud data warehouse”). Snowflake did not offer you a way to host data within your network or within your dedicated subnets within a cloud provider, so companies could not solely rely on those networking barriers to limit malicious counterparties.
Snowflake has apparently begun requiring MFA for new accounts since this incident I’ve heard. If shutting the gate after the horses have left implies culpability, Snowflake has some.
Part of the job of the contractor is taking responsibility with who they take security from. To take it to the logical extreme if 'some rando they met in a bar' offered to store AT&T's credit card information for cheap and it turns out said rando was stealing credit card information? Totally AT&Ts fault for not properly vetting them.
Sure, and then it's the government's job to ensure the shareholders lose their money when the company loses a hundred million customers' records. So yeah, it turns out that when you pay yourself instead of doing right by your customers, I think you shouldn't be allowed to make a profit.
No, they shouldn't be allowed to fuck over their customers at ever turn so they can be greedy. The suggestion that we should be more worried about how much money the AT&T execs and shareholders make over their needs of their 100 million customers is bizarre.
Banks are required to maintain financial transaction records.
Is the argument that governments don't have a good reason to mandate record collection?
Why can't I ask my government to keep me safe from terrorists but also expect that companies will not just be careless with the data they collect as part of that?
Government has no right to track that either, they themselves launder trillions, start wars and massacre millions, even a drug lord is a petty criminal compared to them, and it's clear their tracking of any and all records of any type is more about control than safety, thus it should be disregarded as an argument and be done away with entirely.
The government can't keep its own data safe, as the OPM breach showed. Apart from some resignations, nobody faced any serious consequences for that either.
Many (all?) banks keep financial transaction records for way longer than what is legally required. Thankfully, most banks are technically incompetent and are unable to easily use data that is not relatively recent. In fact, one bank I worked for had to load transactions from a CD-ROM archive which contained all the transactions in a printable text format (the same format as their printed bank statements). Multiple CDs per day, with no indexing or identification beyond the date. Trying to find a specific 10 year old transaction was very hard work indeed.
I don't agree. I don't think it's reasonable to expect it, because companies show over and over that they cannot do it. And let's face it, the only reason your company hasn't fallen victim to a data breach or ransomware is that you haven't been seriously targeted yet.
We need to change our approach. We need to look at why these kinds of data are valuable, and then make them not valuable. Then nobody will bother with hacking to get it.
This data is valuable primarily for spam mitigation and perhaps customer profiling.
Expect every SMS and MMS sent or received to be part of a spam mitigation and profiling program where it's stored indefinitely.
Apple not encrypting RCS is likely due to similar factors, where they have seen existing spam problems on RCS that are much harder to root out when you have end-to-end encryption.
In my not so humble opinion, the biggest problem with phone numbers in general is the general ability to spoof any number. Please correct me if I am wrong but stir/shaken is only available on the new stuff and even then there is no good way to track the origin of a phone call. This is beyond ridiculous and clearly leadership is asleep at the wheel.
There needs to be a firm timeline -- maybe a year maybe a decade, I don't know the details but something that allows customers to transition to a system where all calls can be traced through the network with 100% guarantee.
Step zero is actually having a process/protocol where any phone is tamper evident meaning we can tell 100% that this call came from this operator and the operator knows the call came from this user.
Perhaps the first phase allows individual users to opt in. So we would ask our operators to only route us calls and texts that positively identify themselves as fully traced with whatever the new protocol is that will replace SS7/sigtran so the origin of a call or text is positively identified. If this guarantee is not available, route the call to spam inbox somehow.
Then the hard part I'm guessing is fixing all the defects?
The second phase is to say after this date, no operator in the US is allowed to relay calls that are from legacy systems. This will likely take many years as I don't know how we will handle international calls and texts. But at some point we have to put our foot down and say enough is enough.
> Step zero is actually having a process/protocol where any phone is tamper evident meaning we can tell 100% that this call came from this operator and the operator knows the call came from this user.
This basically doesn't work because the mapping between phone numbers, users and operators isn't exactly 1:1:1.
Some businesses have a single number that they use as Caller ID on all their calls , despite having one corporate HQ in New York, one branch in New Orleans and one customer support callcenter in New Delhi. All of these use different carriers and are based in different countries, yet they're all legally authorized to use that number.
> ...yet they're all legally authorized to use that number.
But why? I get that they want a unifed appearance, but as a phone subscriber I want to know if it's BigCo calling from New Delhi vs. BigCo calling from Chicago.
These are records from 2022. The hack wasn't carried out the second the calls were made. You really need to keep the records that long to do your billing? That's absurd.
I don't think it is. I assume everyone gets hacked eventually. It's really hard (I would argue impossible) to make a 100% secure computer system, and if they're operated by people, you're terribly vulnerable.
Pish posh. They also sell that data at an increidble markup – and without the knowledge of their customers – to anyone who'll pay, including governments and their cutouts.
Spam mitigation and management is a huge bugaboo in wireless networks today.
The big three wireless carriers in the USA today formed a cartel called The Campaign Registry that seeks out TINs/EINs and the SSNs of the owners of Sole Proprietorships and LLCs as part of a lengthy approval process to be allowed to send texts.
It's a great extra judicial rent seeking machine that bans any SHAFT content (sex hate alcohol, tobacco, firearms and anything tangentially related) along with hefty fines for anyone that they feel has crossed said boundaries.
Letting the morality police run amok on our Telecom networks here in the USA is happening, and they also want all the data they can get along with bribes from businesses.
Ajit Pai created the opening for this mess, and the current FCC has done nothing to clean this up (though given recent SCOTUS rulings, who knows if they ever had the authority...)
That T-Mobile is out here slapping spam mitigation blocks on phone numbers who received SHAFT content from numbers on T-Mobile's network is pretty ridiculous, but silently blocking and providing no appeal or escalation path is just how we let companies operate these days.
I've never heard of this, and cursory web searches don't seem to be turning up anything relevant (although that's admittedly not saying much with the state of search lately). Can you explain how the law requires this level of data retention?
Apparently they'd uploaded their customer data into something called Snowflake to do some kind of analysis on it, but it wasn't particularly well secured. They haven't said why they were analysing the data, but there's no indication that it had anything to do with government demands.
"legally required by the government" to keep securely. If you can't keep to the rules don't play the game. I'm sure any other telecom would be glad to get the market share.
That's a good point. Had they valued the citizens' privacy they would have done the opposite, that is make it illegal for network providers to store customer data that is not essential for them providing the services. But I guess creating a dystopian surveillance state is more of a priority.
Sure - pretty well every corporation you purchase a service from is required to store your credit card information as well. But there are stiff penalties from the government and credit card processors for unauthorized access to that information; consequently, it's rarely stolen.
Your address, cell metadata, phone number, email address, and passwords are leaked pretty well contsantly though.
It's not that corporations are incompetent. The laws and regulations mean it's not worth the cost to treat your personal information with any real respect.
> store your credit card information ... but there are stiff penalties from the government and credit card processors for unauthorized access to that information; consequently, it's rarely stolen
Citation: The Onion?
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is the main information security standard for organizations that process credit or debit card information must abide by. The guidelines established in PCI DSS cover how to secure data handling processes.
I'm not saying it doesn't happen. Credit card data is too valuable to never be stolen. I am saying that ~37 to >500 is a hell of a difference in how frequently things are stolen [0]
You pointed out how there are guidelines for holding that information, I'm saying there are consequences [1]. I'm following that up by saying that the consequences for mishandling customer information are not nearly as severe. They do not result in 6 figure fines.
I'm saying the severe consequences to mishandling CC data have led to the incredible disparity shown in the first paragraph
Most places don't actually store or process anybody's credit card information any more, all they have is a Stripe token, which is completely useless to a hacker.
do yourself a favor and accept that phone records have never not been recorded and the data is mostly available for purchase. the company is to blame because they are complicit or negligent in the bespoke surveillance state, probably both.
welcome to a post 9/11 world. privacy has been dying for a long time. the general population doesn't care anymore. they freely give up everything to big tech anyways.
> how weird it is that you're fine with the government getting a record of all your phone activity
I don't like it, but accept it as the lesser evil. I'm from Europe and I believe the number of reported prevented terror attacks. The agencies need data access for that. Not good, but necessary.
But are you aware that Meta, Google, Apple, MS, etc. collect every kind of information about every user of Android, iPhone or WhatsApp, Insta, Facebook, Windows? Phone manufacturer, huge apps like TicToc as well. The kind and size of that data is crazy beyond imagination. I don't care if the government can get access to my WhatsApp messages when some of the most irresponsible companies, collect and use everything to their advantage. Are you really that naive and think that Meta doesn't analyse their gigantic data lake including billions of WhatsApp messages to predict the results of elections? That is the real danger to democracy.
> I don't care if the government can get access to my WhatsApp messages when some of the most irresponsible companies, collect and use everything to their advantage.
This is all voluntary. You give those companies your data. You don't have to. I use grapheneos and do not use any of those socials, for example.
The problem comes as people start shoving more and more DRM around, whether it be Google Play Protect, the new Android WebView Media Integrity API, or an eventual reboot of the Web Environment Integrity proposal.
